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The current morass offederal environmental laws has led to sign ficant
conflicts among statutes and the manner in which agencies implement them.
In recent years, this quagmire of environmental laws has hindered the
progress of a number of high-profile environmental regulatory programs
and restoration projects. Neither the Courts nor legal scholars have
developed approaches to resolving conflicts in a manner that harmonizes
environmental statutes while at the same time protecting the most critical
environmental resources. A standard methodology that optimizes the
multiple objectives of environmental statutes and their implementing
programs would greatly enhance decision-making and ensure that the most
salient environmental objectives are met. Multi-objective optimization is a
decision-making methodology that seeks to optimize multiple objectives.
Although this methodology has been used widely in the business world and
in scientific decision-making, it has not yet made its way into the legal
discourse. This article suggests multi-objective optimization as a structured
decision support tool for prioritizing environmental objectives and
reconciling regulatory programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The sheer volume and complexity of federal laws create multiple,
sometimes conflicting, objectives that must be reconciled through
administrative policy choices or court decisions. Nowhere is the tension
between discordant laws more evident than in environmental law.
Although federal environmental laws all seek to protect aspects of the
environment, in some circumstances federal environmental statutes come
into direct conflict. Such conflicts raise legal issues including: does or
should one statute trump another; are the environmental objectives of one
statute of higher value than those of another; what statutory or regulatory
mechanisms are in place to provide for the flexibility needed to reconcile
the objectives or requirements of the conflicting statutes; and when
environmental objectives are in conflict how should decision-makers
prioritize them?
Rigid statutory schemes and judicial mandates can result in
unintended environmental resource tradeoffs. Even where statutes
provide flexibility mechanisms for resolving conflicts, challenges remain.
Without a structured process for determining how best to resolve
conflicts, statutes may be implemented in ways that give priority to less
important environmental objectives over more critical ones. In some
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situations, a race to the courthouse may determine which objectives are
given priority rather than a reasoned approach to determining how to
optimize the most important objectives.
This paper explores potential tools for resolving the types of conflicts
that have arisen in a number of real-world circumstances. This article
suggests multi-objective optimization as a structured decision support tool
to reconcile discordant environmental statutes. The multi-objective
approach optimizes the statutes' goals and provides a structured
framework for prioritizing objectives and making tradeoffs to achieve the
best results possible. Although explored in business, engineering, and
environmental management literature for years, multi-objective
optimization has yet to become part of the legal scholarly discourse. Not
only does this article make the case that multi-objective optimization has
the potential to vastly improve environmental decision-making, but it
does so within a specific legal context-where environmental laws have
conflicting or competing objectives or standards, or where environmental
regulatory agencies and courts have interpreted environmental laws in a
discordant manner. This article posits that multi-objective optimization
can provide a useful roadmap for working through complex
environmental law matters and can help to de-conflict discordant
environmental laws. Drawing upon real-world conflicts that have arisen
in the context of environmental regulation and environmental restoration,
this article explores the utility of multi-objective optimization in de-
conflicting environmental statutes and, through the use of a simplified
fictional ecosystem restoration scenario, provides a roadmap for how
multi-objective optimization could be used in a qualitative, if not
quantitative manner.
Part II of this Article describes the problem of discordant
environmental laws and provides several real-world examples. These
range from multiple objectives embedded in a single statute administered
by a single agency to the morass of competing objectives of various
environmental statutes administered by multiple agencies that govern
major environmental restoration projects such as the Everglades
restoration. The examples set forth in this part illustrate how discordant
environmental statutes cause confusion, agency paralysis, and litigation
that often create barriers to meeting important environmental objectives.
Part III explores how some courts have grappled with resolving
discordance among environmental statutes. Part IV of this article
describes multi-objective optimization and how it has been employed as
a form of multi-criteria decision-making. In Part V, the use of multi-
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objective optimization is demonstrated with a fictional factual scenario
involving three federal environmental statutes: the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 2 and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA).3 This Part explores multi-objective optimization's
utility as a means of optimizing environmental statutory objectives where
conflicts cannot be avoided. Based on the results of these evaluations, this
paper concludes with recommendations for resolving conflicts and
optimizing multiple objectives.
II. DISCORDANT ENVIROMENTAL STATUTES: REAL WORLD EXAMPLES
A long-standing challenge in environmental protection, management,
and restoration is how to navigate the labyrinth of piecemeal
environmental laws, which leaves gaps, overlap, and sometimes conflict,
in a manner to address complex ecosystems' needs.4 In many
circumstances, a variety of federal laws can be used in a complementary
way to achieve environmental goals. For example, Sandra Zellmer has
opined that while no one federal statute or legal principle can adequately
accomplish the task of protecting the wild, the complementary
implementation of several laws including the Wilderness Act, the legal
doctrines of federally reserved water rights, the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, and the CWA can better achieve the goal of protection of the wild.5
In certain situations, however, laws designed to protect certain aspects of
the environment conflict in ways that make it difficult, if not impossible,
for agencies to move forward to achieve environmental goals without
running afoul of the law. The threat of being sued for violations of
1. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
2. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
3. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 703-712 (2012).
4. The examples described in this section involve discordance between federal environmental
statutes. Of course, conflict can occur between state or local government environmental laws. One
example of a conflict between local government environmental laws is the conflict between
ordiriances that require trees to be cut down or trimmed so that the sun can reach solar panels versus
tree protection ordinances that prohibit cutting down or trimming of certain trees. A multi-objective
optimization strategy may be beneficial in resolving disputes at that level, as well as at the federal
level. The multi-objective optimization methodology described in this article would only apply to
conflicts between laws at the same level of government. Conflicts between laws at different levels
of government invoke other legal solutions. For example, a state environmental protection law that
is in direct conflict with a federal environmental protection law may be determined to be impliedly
preempted by the federal law. Similar preemption may occur where local government law conflicts
with state law.
5. Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 42 Envt'1 L. 313, 315 (2012).
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environmental law, whether real or perceived, has at times resulted in
regulatory paralysis. The paralysis resulting from an agency's reluctance
to act under one environmental law for fear of violation of another can
result in delay in environmental protection and in some cases can lead to
further environmental degradation.6 In most circumstances, conflicts that
arise among federal statutes are due to conflicts in the manner in which
statutes are interpreted and implemented rather than direct irreconcilable
conflicts between the laws. Even where conflicts appear to be
insurmountable, however, most environmental statutes contain at least
some level of flexibility.
Although conflicts between laws designed to protect environmental
values have arisen in a variety of scenarios, the federal environmental
statute that appears to conflict the most with other environmental statutes
is the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA is the federal statute
targeted at protecting threatened and endangered species and the habitats
upon which they rely. The ESA applies to actions carried out by all federal
agencies regardless of the agency's statutory mandates or objectives.
Accordingly, the ESA's objective of protecting endangered species
frequently conflicts with other statutory objectives, such as constructing
infrastructure, regulating to protect other resources, or carrying out
environmental restoration projects. The interplay between the ESA and
other federal environmental laws has not been fully reconciled by
Congress, the Courts, or the environmental agencies.
The ESA has been characterized in both the legal literature and court
opinions as a particularly rigid and absolutist statute. In particular, the
Section 7 consultation requirement is considered to be a legal hammer
that can create barriers to a more integrated approach to resolving
environmental problems with multiple objectives. The ESA is intended to
err on the side of protection of species. Despite its notoriety as perhaps
the most hardline environmental law, however, the ESA contains a
number of tools that may provide flexibility to resolve some of these
conflicts. These include safe harbor agreements,7 habitat conservation
6. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: THE
FOURTH BIENNIAL REVIEW.32-37 (2012) [hereinafter NRC Report 2012].
7. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32717 (June 17, 1999).
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planning,8 water or wildlife mitigation, assisted migration, and incidental
take authorizations.9
The ESA is administered and enforced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) (managing freshwater and terrestrial species) and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (managing marine and
anadromous species). These two agencies are referred to collectively as
"the Services." The two primary protections afforded to species listed
pursuant to the ESA are the prohibition on the "taking" of listed species
under Section 9 and the consultation requirements under Section 7. The
ESA defines the term "take" broadly to include "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt to engage in
any such conduct."' 0 The Services' regulations further define the term
"harm" to include acts that involve significant habitat modification or
degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering. This regulatory definition has been upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court." Moreover, for habitats designated as "critical
habitat[s]," additional protections are afforded.1 2 Violators of the Section
9 take prohibition are subject to injunctive relief and criminal and civil
penalties resulting from enforcement actions brought by the Services or
legal actions brought by private individuals or organizations pursuant to
the ESA's citizen suit provision.13
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that, prior to engaging in any
federal agency action that "may affect" listed species, the federal agency
must consult with the Services to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat] of
8. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (February
23, 1998).
9. Endagered Species Act § 7(b)(4), 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(b)(4) (providing for takes incidental
to federal agency action); 16 U.S.C.S. § 1539(a) (providing for permit authorization for certain takes
that are incidental to non-federal action).
10. Id. § 1532(19).
11. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding
as reasonable the Services' definition of harm to include "significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife").
12. Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Definition of
Destruction of Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7214 (February 11, 2016).
13. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1540 (2012).
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such species."1 4 The term "jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species" includes actions that can reasonably be expected, directly or
indirectly, to appreciably reduce the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild. Through the consultation process,
the Services determine whether the federal agency action is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species. Consultation
culminates in the Services issuing a Biological Opinion (BiOp). If the
Services make ajeopardy finding, the BiOp must include "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" that if implemented would avoid jeopardy.
Where an agency determines, with written concurrence of the
Services, that its proposed action is "not likely to adversely affect" listed
species, a more truncated consultation process known as informal
consultation is permitted. Conflicts between the objectives of the ESA and
objectives of other environmental statutes frequently arise where a federal
agency triggers the need for the consultation or causes a take of a listed
species, either by carrying out, funding, or authorizing an activity under
the terms of the other environmental statutes.
An example of the perceived rigidity of the ESA is the conflicting
objectives of protecting fish species listed under the ESA while providing
water necessary for agricultural irrigation. This conflict has existed for
quite some time and for many years appeared to be intractable. Many
blamed the ESA's perceived rigidity as creating a barrier to addressing
system-wide needs in a more integrative manner.
Even the ESA, often considered to be the most inflexible, contains
several provisioris that allow takes of listed species in certain
circumstances. For example, as part of a BiOp for a federal action that
may affect a listed species, the Services may issue an incidental take
statement, which provides legal cover for limited, specified takes of listed
species incidental to the proposed federal action. In many cases, the
assurance that limited takes will not result in violations of the ESA or
trigger citizen suit enforcement actions may be sufficient to provide the
flexibility needed to undertake a federal environmental restoration
project, promulgate an environmental regulation, or otherwise exercise
authority under a federal environmental statute. Similarly, Section 10 of
the ESA authorizes the Services to issue permits to authorize specific
"takes" of a listed species, if the "taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity" and "will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
14. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
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species in the wild."'5 To obtain such a permit, a permit applicant must
develop a "habitat conservation plan" that minimizes and mitigates
impact of the taking to the maximum extent practicable.1 6 Periittees are
shielded from liability provided that they comply with the Reasonable and
Prudent Measures contained in the permit and the measures provided in
the habitat conservation plan. Additional flexibility is provided by the
Services' "Safe Harbor Policy." Pursuant to this policy, the Services will
enter into voluntary agreements with private or other non-federal property
owners who undertake actions that contribute to the recovery of listed
species. In exchange, the property owner receives assurance from the
Services that if they comply with the terms of the agreement, the Services
will not require any additional or different activities to protect listed
species.1 7 Finally, flexibility is provided via the Services' Mitigation
Policy, which authorizes the Services to require compensatory mitigation
for impacts to listed species for federal actions that require an incidental
take statement under Section 7 and for incidental take permits issued
under Section 10.18 These flexibility mechanisms alleviate much of the
ESA's rigidity.
In fact, there are several instances where federal agencies have used
flexibility in the ESA to address socioeconomic concerns while still
ensuring species protection have succeeded. For example, Gosnell et al.,
explain how an integrative systems-based approach to resolving conflicts
between fish protection under the ESA and agricultural interests in the
Klamath basin resulted in a 2013 joint BiOp containing coordinated,
place-based recommendations for conserving species while meeting the
needs of agricultural interests. ' The authors suggest that by identifying
leaders who can find ways to creatively avoid entrenchment and facilitate
15. Id. § 1539(a).
16. Habitat Conscrvation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859
(February 23, 1998). See also John Charles Kunich, Species and Habitation Conservation: The
Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501 (1994);
Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel ofthe Endangered
Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998); Robert D. Thornton, The Endangered Species Act:
Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 21 ENvTL. L. 605 (1991).
17. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32717 (June 17, 1999); Habitat
Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (February 23, 1998).
18. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 83440 (Nov. 21, 2016).
19. See Hannah Gosnell et al., Transforming (Perceived) Rigidity in Environmental Law
Through Adaptive Governance: A Case of Endangered Species Act Implementation, 22 ECOLOGY
& SoC'Y 42 (2017).
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cooperation in the early stages of problem solving, more cooperative and
adaptive resolution of environmental problems can be found.
Examples of creative, cooperative, and integrative approaches to
resolving environmental problems demonstrate that statutory rigidity is
often more perceived than real, and communication, cooperation, and
trust can go a long way to find solutions that meet multiple objectives
even in the face of the rigid mandates of the ESA. 20 Nevertheless, even
where creativity can be employed in a way to reduce rigidity and provide
flexibility, it is still necessary to have a process in place to guide
optimization of multiple objectives such that flexible approaches are used
in an optimal manner.
Frequently, but not always, conflicts involving the ESA also involve
other wildlife protection statutes such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA).21 As with the ESA, the MBTA can be triggered when the use of
pesticides harms covered species. The MBTA implements four
international treaties that are aimed at protecting migratory birds. The
scope of the MBTA is quite broad and covers almost all native North
American birds. 2 2 Some, but not all, migratory birds covered by the
MBTA are also a listed species under the ESA and thus both Acts apply
to those species. Under the MBTA, it is unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner to: hunt, take, capture, kill, possess, purchase,
sell, barter, or transport any bird protected by the Treaty, any part, nest,
or egg of a protected bird or any product composed of any part, nest, or
egg of a protected bird, except as permitted by regulation of the Secretary
of the Interior. 2 3 Violations of this prohibition can result in criminal
penalties. 2 4 As with the ESA, the MBTA prohibits "takes," however, the
MBTA does not define the term. Regulations adopted pursuant to the
MBTA define "take" to mean "pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or attempt" any of the foregoing.25 In contrast to the
ESA, the regulatory definition of harm under the MBTA does not
20. Id
21. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 703-712 (2012). For the protection of marine mammals, the primary
legislative authority is the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1361-1421 (2012).
22. Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359,
378 (1999). However, non-native species are not covered, and hence not protected, under the
MBTA. Id. at 381-85.
23. 16 U.S.C.S. § 703 (2012).
24. Id § 707 (2012).
25. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2018).
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expressly include habitat modifications and the courts have not definitely
weighed in on how far the MBTA goes to protect habitat.2 6
Unlike the ESA, the MBTA does not expressly contemplate
authorization of incidental takes of protected species and to date, the
USFWS has not promulgated a regulatory program to do so. In May 2015,
USFWS issued a Notice expressing its planned proposal to authorize
incidental take of migratory birds under the MBTA. The USFWS
indicated that it was considering a variety of approaches, including
general authorization for certain types of hazards to birds associated with
particular industry sectors. It also indicated it was contemplating creating
memoranda of understanding with federal agencies authorizing incidental
take from those agencies' "operations and activities" to encourage
agencies to employ appropriate conservation measures to avoid or reduce
avian mortality and to create a regulatory mechanism for mortality that
cannot be avoided or minimized through best practices or technologies.
To date, the USFWS has not published the proposed rule. Nevertheless,
in the past, USFWS has permitted limited "takes" of birds under specific
circumstances through the issuance of "special use" permits for incidental
takes under limited specified circumstances 27 pursuant to an existing rule
that authorizes the issuance of permits for special purpose activities if
there is a benefit to the migratory bird resource or for other compelling
reasons. USFWS has relied on this rule to authorize incidental takes of
avian species protected by the MBTA, including permitting the National
Marine Fisheries Service to take birds incidental to certain fishing
operations in Hawaii. 28 In the past, USFWS has entered into memoranda
of understanding with federal agencies, including with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, recognizing that "actions taken to benefit some
migratory bird populations may adversely affect other migratory bird
26. See Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 22, at 390.; Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for
Expansion ofthe Migratory Bird Treaty Act for the Protection ofMigratory Birds, 40 NAT. RES. J.
47, 50-54 (2000) (tracing the history of MBTA cases where parties were found liable for indirect
takings of migratory birds, including takings that occurred as a result of pesticide poisoning); Erin
C. Perkins, Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
to Rejuvenate America's National Environmental Policy, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 817 (1998).
27. NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., ENGINEERING, & MED., PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE
EVERGLADES: THE SIXTH BIENNIAL REVIEW 65 (2016) [hereinafter NRC Report 2016]; 50 C.F.R.
§ 21.27 (2018).
28. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: ISSUANCE OF
AN MBTA PERMIT TO THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL
TAKE OF SEABIRDS IN THE HAWAII-BASED SHALLOW-SET LONGLINE FISHERY (2012), https://
www.fws.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/pdf/NMFS%20Permit%2ODraft%20EA.pdf
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populations" and that "actions that may provide long-term benefits to
migratory bird populations may have short-term impacts on individual
birds." 2 9
The problem of optimizing multiple objectives becomes more
complex when dealing with two or more environmental statutes
implemented by more than one environmental agency. Although statutes
such as the ESA and the MBTA may have differing objectives than some
other environmental statutes, in many cases, it is not the statutes
themselves that are the primary problems. Instead, agency regulations and
policies implemented under the statutes may be the primary sources of the
discordancy. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts will afford deference to
each agency in the way it interprets the statute it is charged with
implementing. 30 If agencies interpret their respective statues in ways that
conflict, conflicts will arise that may be difficult to for courts to reconcile.
One agency's regulatory choice may conflict with the manner in which
another agency implements its regulatory programs. For example, the text
of the ESA provides very limited instruction on the process by which
agencies must consult under Section 7.31 Instead, the processes that
agencies must undergo have been spelled out in detail through regulations
promulgated by the Services. 32 The Services' consultation process can be
time and resource-intensive and can cause delay and challenges for
agencies, such as EPA, in implementing their own regulations and
programs aimed at other aspects of environmental protection. Moreover,
historical agency processes and cultures may exacerbate conflicts and
serve as barriers to resolution. Historical agency processes and differences
in institutional culture were part of the source of conflict between the ESA
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticides Act (FIFRA),
described below. 33 When evaluating discordant statues, it is important to
29. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13186, "RESPONSIBILITIES OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES TO PROTECT MIGRATORY BIRDS" (2011), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou/
mou-fws.pdf (last visited August 12, 2018).
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing a two-part test
for judicial review of agency action and holding that where Congress has not directly spoken to an
issue or where a statue is ambiguous, courts are to give deference to permissible agency
interpretations of the statute).
31. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536 (2012).
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 93.105(b) (2012).
33. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING RISKS TO ENDANGERED AND THREATENED
SPECIES FROM PESTICIDES 4 (2013) [hereinafter FIFRA/ESA NRC Report].
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consider whether the root of the problem is statutory, regulatory, or
agency culture. Inertia and reluctance to deviate from the status quo may
be barriers to overcoming agency culture. From a legal standpoint, it will
be easier to modify the culture than to persuade Congress to amend
statutes in ways that better reconcile their objectives or even to convince
agencies to undertake the arduous rulemaking process to harmonize
environmental objectives and processes.
A. One Agency/One Statute: Forest Management Plans
National Forests are managed by the U.S. Forest Service pursuant to
the requirements of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).34
Although management of National Forests is governed by a single agency
under a single statute, the statute mandates that the Forest Service engage
in National Forest System Resource Planning to provide for multiple uses
and sustained yields of forest products. 3 5 The Forest Service regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Act set forth a lengthy list of ecological and
socioeconomic concerns that must be included in each plan, including: air
quality; water quality; cultural and historic resources; ecosystem service;
opportunities for timber and forage production; opportunities to connect
people with nature; restoring and protecting riparian areas; reduction of
soil erosion and sedimentation; and sustainable recreation. 36 Certain of
these objectives may conflict with each other. For example, actions
designed to protect ecosystem services may be inconsistent with
promoting forage opportunities by limiting the acreage that can be
harvested. Similarly, managing in a way to protect water quality by
minimizing pollution runoff may reduce timber production by requiring
harvesting to be done in a more deliberate manner rather than through
traditional clearcutting. Accordingly, the Forest Service, in developing a
Forest Management Plan, must find ways to balance and harmonize
competing objectives. Because the Forest Service is a single agency
operating under a single statute and because considerable flexibility is
built into the governing statute and regulations-i.e., there is not an
absolute requirement to achieve each objective in every area of each
National Forest-attempts to harmonize discordancy within a Forest
Management Plan do not encounter the same hurdles as those faced by
34. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1600-1614 (2012).
35. Id. § 1604.
36. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.8-10 (2018).
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multiple agencies operating under multiple statutes with more rigid
requirements.
B. Two Agencies/Multiple Statutes
The challenges posed by discordant environmental laws become more
profound where more than one agency is involved and multiple statutes
are at play. In such circumstances, differences in agency culture,
combined with conflicting statutory mandates, objectives, and standards,
have resulted in decision-making paralysis and absurd outcomes at odds
with environmental protection goals.
1. Renewable energy and species protection
One area where the objectives of both the ESA and the MBTA conflict
with environmental objectives of other environmental laws involves the
use of renewable energy sources to mitigate climate change contributing
greenhouse gas emissions, which has led to an increase in wind energy
production. 37 The most significant rule in this regard is the Obama
Administration's Clean Power Plan regulation, promulgated pursuant to
the Clean Air Act and later proposed to be dismantled by the Trmp
Administration.38 This regulation would have established, among other
things, zero emission renewable energy such as wind power as a means
of meeting the emissions reductions required under the regulation. 39
While there is little doubt that wind production has significant
environmental benefits in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
37. See Samuel J. Panarella, For the Birds: Wind Energy, Dead Eagles, and Unwelcome
Surprises, 20 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 3 (2014); Derek Bertsch, When Good
Intentions Collide: Seeking a Solution to Disputes Between Alternative Energy Development and
the Endangered Species Act, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.J. 74 (2011).
38. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510 (October
23, 2015).
39. The Clean Power plan was challenged in Court and the Supreme Court stayed its
implementation. Shortly after taking office, President Trump, through executive order, called for
the review of the Clean Power Plan. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
The Trump administration has since announced that it plans to replace the Clean Power plan with
an alternative regulation but has not yet disclosed the requirements of the replacement regulation.
See Timothy Cama, Trump Officials Eying Replacement for Key Obama Climate Rule, THE HILL
(Sept. 15, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-cnvironmcnt/350759-trump-officials-eying-
replacement-for-key-obama-climate-rule. On August 21, 2018, EPA proposed the "Affordable
Clean Energy Rule," which is designed to be a substitute for the Clean Power Plan. See Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Proposal: Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.cpa.gov/
stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordablc-clcan-energy-ace-rulc.
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there is also a downside. Studies demonstrate that wind turbines harm
avian and bat species, many of which are protected by the ESA or MBTA,
through direct collisions, electrocution, and affecting behaviors such as
foraging and migrations. 4 0 Thus, the statutes' multiple objectives-which
include reducing GHG emissions to mitigate climate change, protecting
endangered species, and protecting migratory birds-create a classic
multi-objective problem. The problem is compounded, moreover, by the
fact that three different environmental laws clash in a way that makes it
difficult to comply with all three.
The environmental decision-making problem created by pitting wind
production against birds and bats is more complex than it may seem at
first blush. Wind energy is an important component of renewable energy
,necessary to achieve a reduced-carbon society. 4 1 Widespread use of
renewable energies has the potential to mitigate climate change. 4 2
Significant climate change mitigation will have worldwide environmental
benefits, including the benefit of protecting countless species from the
risk of potential extinction.4 3 A number of options could be employed to
optimize one or the other objective. For example, locations such as
migratory bird flyways might be classified as inappropriate locations for
wind turbines. Moreover, there may be ways to construct or operate wind
turbines that reduce the risk of bird collisions.
On the other hand, some avian or bird mortality may be acceptable,
given the significant benefits of renewable energy.44 Perhaps some
species, such as non-native species or species that exist in great
abundance, may be more expendable than others, such as threatened or
endangered species or species that play important roles in ecosystem
function.45 A range of potential options may exist, each of which
comprises a trade-off between the objectives of maximizing renewable
energy production and protecting avian species. Decision-makers must
choose from among these options, none of which are ideal for both
objectives. Nevertheless, it is possible to find ways to harmonize these
40. Bertsch, supra note 37, at 81-82.
41. Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable
Generation Capacity, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10591 (2017).
42. Id.
43. James Ming Chen, Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of Climate Change
Through the Endangered Species Act, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11 (2015).
44. See Cassie Tigue, Wind Energy Development and Protection of Wildlife: Creating a
Balance Between Two Competing Interests, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2015).
45. See id.
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discordances through regulatory processes without requiring statutory
amendment.
2. Pesticide regulation and species protection
The ESA also conflicts in a number of significant ways with the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The two
statutes differ dramatically in their goals, standards, focus, and method.
These conflicts have created a decades-long stand-off between the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency charged with
implementing FIFRA, and the Services, the federal agencies charged with
ESA implementation and enforcement. In a previous article, the author
addressed the challenge of reconciling FIFRA's cost-benefit balancing
standard for regulatory decision-making regarding pesticides, with the
ESA's absolutist prohibitions on takes of listed species and prevention of
jeopardy to listed species. 4 6 EPA and the Services spent years at odds over
these differing approaches, as well as the differing geographic and
temporal focus and differing risk reduction methods under the two
statutes.47
One of the most significant conflicts between the ESA and FIFRA is
the disparate standards that govern regulatory action under the respective
statutes. 4 8 EPA's interpretation and implementation of FIFRA involves a
balancing of the risks associated with the use of the pesticide against the
social and economic benefits to society accruing from the use of the
pesticide. Accordingly, the potential exists for a pesticide that poses high
risks to threatened or endangered species to be registered under FIFRA,
if that pesticide provides economic benefits that outweigh those risks.4 9
Conversely, the ESA strictly prohibits takes of threatened and endangered
species without consideration of economic or other social concerns. The
Section 7 consultation mandates ensure that federal agency actions do not
jeopardize the continued existence of a threatened and endangered
species. 0 Accordingly, the very terms of the statutes have created a catch-
22 situation for EPA. If EPA follows the FIFRA cost-benefit standard, it
may approve a pesticide that jeopardizes a threatened or endangered
46. Mary Jane Angelo, The Killing Fields: Reducing the Casualties in the Battle Between
U.S. Endangered Species and Pesticide Law, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 96, 110 (2008).
47. Id. at 110-17.
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id at 139-40.
50. See supra pp. 5-6.
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species.51 Accordingly, it may be in violation of the ESA. On the other
hand, if EPA chooses to comply with the ESA and deny or severely
restrict a registration, EPA could be vulnerable to legal challenges for not
properly implementing its FIFRA mandate to consider economics in its
registration decisions. 5 2 Moreover, because pesticides are by their very
nature intended to kill organisms in the environment, and because there is
habitat for the more than 1800 listed species throughout a wide and vast
range of the territory of the United States, strict compliance with the ESA
under the existing FIFRA framework could result in EPA banning or
severely restricting a large number of currently registered pesticides. Such
an interpretation would lead to the ESA virtually swallowing up FIFRA.
This dilemma is likely a large contributor to EPA's ongoing reluctance to
comply with the ESA in implementing its pesticide registration
program.5 3
It should be noted that although the standards of the ESA and FIFRA
are not easily reconcilable, FIFRA does provide EPA with limited express
authority to take certain regulatory action to protect listed species.
Specifically, as described above, Section 6(c) of FIFRA authorizes EPA
to suspend the registration of a pesticide if necessary to prevent an
"imminent hazard" during the time required for a cancellation
proceeding. 54 FIFRA Section 2(1) defines the term "imminent hazard" to
include a "situation which exists when the continued use of a pesticide
during the time required for cancellation proceeding ... will involve
unreasonable hazard to the survival of a species declared endangered or
threatened by the Secretary pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of
1973 . .. . ."55 Under this standard, EPA clearly has the authority to
suspend a registration to address hazards to listed species. Accordingly,
EPA could bring a suspension action to prevent the extirpation of a listed
species from the use of the pesticide. However, nothing in FIFRA
indicates how listed species concerns should be addressed under the cost-
benefit standard for registration or cancellation.
As with the ESA, the MBTA's standards are not easily reconcilable
with those of FIFRA. First, the MBTA imposes a strict liability standard
51. Angelo, supra note 46, at 135.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (2012).
55. 7 U.S.C. § 136(1).
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for takes of migratory birds.56 Courts have applied this strict liability
standard to pesticide-related bird deaths.57 This strict liability standard is
in direct conflict with the explicit balancing decisions required for FIFRA
pesticide registration. As one author has stated, "[R]egular repeated bird
kills might ... [be] tolerated had the benefits of the pesticide in question
been greater." 8 Moreover, as with the ESA, and as others have noted,
pesticide labeling under FIFRA does not on its own protect migratory
birds from poisoning. 59
In addition to the conflicting standards of the ESA and FIFRA, the
differing focuses of the two statutes create incompatibility. "FIFRA
creates a national registration process, while the ESA ... evaluates
individual actions' impacts on a specific habitat and species." 60 The ESA
is concerned with preventing injury to individual members of each listed
species, and with preventing significant modifications to the habitat of
each listed species that would result in injury to the members of the
species. 61 Such modifications include habitat modifications that impact
breeding and nesting, activities that typically occur in specific geographic
locations during specific times of the year for each species.62 The ESA is
also concerned with preventing injury to designated critical habitat, which
by its very nature is geographically defined. 63 Accordingly, the ESA is
geographically and temporally focused.
In contrast, under FIFRA:
A decision on whether to register or cancel a pesticide is made on a
nationwide basis without any real consideration of specific geographic
or temporal factors. For example, a particular pesticide may easily meet
the cost-benefit registration standard because on a nationwide basis the
benefits of the pesticide exceed the environmental or health costs.
56. See Pierre Mineau, Birds and Pesticides: Are Pesticide Regulatory Decisions Consistent
with the Protection Afforded Migratory Bird Species Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act?, 28
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 313, 329-31 (2004).
57. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
58. Mineau, supra note 56 at 332.
59. Id. at 338. In this article, the author concludes that because MBTA's provisions relate
only to direct, lethal pesticide exposures, they do not fully address the problem. Id. at 335.
60. Angelo, supra note 46, at 136. See also, Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty,
Complexity, and Change: An Eco-pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental
Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105 (2006).
61. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S: 687 (1995).
62. Id
63. Endangered Species Act § 4, 16 U.S.C. §1533 (2012).
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However, this decision ignores the fact that the pesticide may pose
substantial risks to a particular listed species that nests in a particular
geographic location during certain times of the year. Although in theory,
such geographic and temporal concerns could be addressed through
label restrictions directing users not to use the pesticide in certain
geographic locations during certain times of the year, the reality is that
they would be extremely unwieldy. It would be extremely unlikely that
EPA could require such detailed label restrictions on every pesticide
product to address every geographic or temporal restriction needed to
protect every listed species in the entire United States. Moreover, even
if EPA did require such detailed label restrictions, it is unlikely that a
pesticide user would take the time to read these complex restrictions,
determine which if any restrictions apply to the user's intended use in a
given location and at a particular time for each and every listed species
that may be affected, let alone actually comply with such restrictions.
Moreover, monitoring users to ensure they comply with the label
restrictions and enforcing against those who did not would be virtually
impossible.
Finally, the ESA and FIFRA are inconsistent in that they provide for
very different risk reduction methods. Under the ESA, the FWS or
NMFS will issue, as part of a BiOp ... an incidental take statement,
which identifies actions that will not be considered to be prohibited
takings [under Section 9]. The incidental take statement specifies the
reasonable and prudent measures that must be implemented to minimize
the risk of takes.64
Unless these measures are complied with, any resulting takes will be a
violation of the Act. These reasonable and prudent measures typically are
very detailed, species-specific, geographically defined, and temporally
defined. 65 As described above, FIFRA's mechanisms for regulating use
of pesticides to reduce risk are label restrictions." 66 Imposition of detailed
reasonable and prudent measures set forth in incidental take statements in
BiOps is impracticable and unlikely to result in widespread compliance
by purchasers and users of pesticides.6 7
In 2005, in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA (WTC), 68 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's ruling that EPA had
64. Angelo, supra note 46, at 136.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom.
CropLife Am. v. Wash. Toxics Coal., 546 U.S. 1090 (2006).
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violated the ESA by failing to take steps to ensure that the registration of
fifty-four pesticides would not jeopardize the survival of listed' salmon
species. The court rejected EPA's attempt to circumvent ESA
consultation in making regulatory decisions under FIFRA.69 EPA asserted
that it was bound only to apply the provisions of FIFRA, which had
limited statutory language relating to listed species. Specifically, 7 U.S.C.
§136d(c)(1)-(2) authorize EPA to suspend the registration of a pesticide
for an immiment hazard, which can include its effect on endangered
species.70 EPA maintained that it did not have an independent duty under
the ESA to undergo consultation on pesticide regulatory decisions. 71 The
Ninth Circuit rejected EPA's arguments, finding that that FIFRA does not
allow EPA to exempt itself from the requirements of the ESA, and that
the ESA requires EPA to comply with the Section 7 consultation
requirements wherever its registration of a pesticide will affect listed
species .72
This ruling made clear that EPA could not ignore its ESA obligations,
despite the discordances between FIFRA and the ESA and the practical
challenges of implementing ESA requirements through the FIFRA
regulatory process. 73 The WTC decision requiring EPA to comply with
the ESA was not the end of the matter. EPA and the Services continued
to struggle with how to reconcile two statutes with differing purposes and
standards. 7 4 Having a court declare that the statutes are reconcilable did
not automatically guide the agencies in navigating the numerous
disparities in the statutes and in the manner in which the agencies interpret
and implement the statutes.
A significant challenge to reconciling FIFRA and ESA objectives and
processes is the cultural and institutional difference between the unit of
EPA that implements FIFRA, the Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP),
and the Services. Many units within EPA had an environmental protection
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1031.
71. See id. After the WTC case, in what is commonly referred to as the "mega ESA litigation,"
the Ninth Circuit limited the requirement for ESA consultation on regulatory actions under FIFRA
to those actions, such as initial registration of a pesticide, that comprise affirmative action. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. EPA, 847 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2017). The court also found that continued
discretionary control and involvement in a pesticide registration did not constitute "ongoing agency
action" sufficient to trigger consultation. Id. at 1090.
72. See Wash. Toxics Coalition, 413 F.3d at 1031-32.
73. Id
74. Angelo, supra note 46, at 113-16.
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culture and focus from the outset. In contrast, OPP's origins were in the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). When EPA was established in
1970, pesticide regulation authority and staff were transferred from the
USDA to EPA's OPP. 75 The USDA's purposes of advancing and
supporting agriculture became part of the OPP culture. 76 Although OPP
is required by statute to consider ecological impacts in its FIFRA
decision-making,77 its origins and continuing cultural identity fall more
squarely in supporting agricultural interests and human health protection
than in ecological protection. In fact, a longstanding, significant conflict
between EPA's approach to ecological risk assessment under FIFRA and
the Services' approach under the ESA was that EPA focuses on adverse
impacts to individual members of a species (e.g., how toxic a particular
pesticide to individuals of a particular species) rather than looking at
population or ecosystem-wide impacts (e.g., whether a particular
pesticide will significantly reduce a population of a particular species
whose reduction will have significant impacts to the ecosystem by, for
example, reducing predation that normally would occur on species lower
on the food chain).78
To help resolve the regulatory discordance and disparities in the
institutional approaches of EPA and the Services, in 2011 EPA and the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior required that the
National Research Council of the National Academies convene a
committee of independent experts to weigh in on a range of issues related
to tools and approaches to reconcile EPA and the Services' approaches to
assessing the effects of proposed regulatory actions under FIFRA on
endangered and threatened species. 79 The Committee recommended that
the agencies adopt a common approach to ecological risk assessment
rather than each employing their own approach.80 The Report outlined an
75. Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140. Prior to the creation of
EPA in 1970, the USDA was responsible for administering FIFRA. In 1970, these responsibilities
were transferred to EPA.
76. One of USDA's stated goals is to promote agricultural production. See About the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov/our-agcncy/about-usda
(last visited Aug. 21, 2018).
77. 7 U.S.C. §§136(bb), 136a(a) (2012).
78. COMM. ON ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER FIFRA AND ESA, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ASSESSrNG RISKS TO ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES FROM PESTICIDES
(2013).
79. Id. at ix-xi.
80. Id. at 5-8.
184 [Vol. 38: 165
DISCORDANT ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
ecological assessment process and described how conflicts could be
avoided if the Services would build on EPA's analysis of whether a
pesticide is likely to adversely affect a listed species, rather than
conducting a completely new analysis.81 The Report also recommended,
among other things, improved communication and coordination
throughout the ecological assessment process. 2
In response to the Report, EPA and the Services developed a white
paper, which provides interim guidance for resolving interagency disputes
in the pesticide-regulation process. 83 The white paper explains the
common process the agencies intend to use and describes how the
agencies will improve coordination. The agencies' agreement to use a
common approach rather than working at cross-purposes is a significant
development. This interim approach moves the ball forward in terms of
having a coordinated, consistent framework between EPA and the USDA,
particularly with regard to the consultation process and the specifics of
ecological risk assessment.8 4 However, the approach does not specifically
address the broader issue of the differences between the two statutes. It
remains to be seen whether the proposed approach to the ecological risk
assessment and the consultation processes are adequate to avoid future
conflicts. For example, it is not clear what might happen if the services
make a jeopardy determination for a pesticide that EPA believes meets
the FIFRA "unreasonable adverse effects"85 standard for registration.
C. Mulitple Conflicting Statutes: The Everglades Example
The examples described above involve conflicts between two distinct
agencies and the environmental laws applicable to them. Conflicts among
multiple environmental laws with related but differing objectives also
arise. In particular, complex, large-scale environmental restoration
projects often invoke multiple environmental laws. One of the most
obvious places this has occurred is in the context of Everglades
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., INTERIM APPROACHES FOR NATIONAL-
LEVEL PESTICIDE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ASSESSMENTS BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES APRIL 2013 REPORT (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-07/documents/interagency.pdf.
84. Id.
85. 7 U.S.C. §136(bb).
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restoration. 86 The Everglades comprise a vast and extremely complex
ecosystem, which has been substantially altered and managed by humans
beginning in the late-nineteenth century, when large portions of the
system were drained to "improve" them for human use. The most
significant alterations occurred in the mid-twentieth century, when the
U.S. Congress authorized the Central and Southern Florida (C&SF)
Project, which was designed to provide flood control and agricultural
water supply. 87 Decades of work resulted in an extensive, highly
engineered system of ditches, dikes, water control structures, and pumps,
which are actively operated through a sophisticated control system."
Attempts to reverse and restore the Everglades have been ongoing for
decades. Everglades restoration efforts are challenging given the complex
nature of the ecosystem. Each component of the Everglades is connected
to other parts such that even a minor change in any part could greatly
affect other locations. 89 Restoration is further complicated by the decades
of engineering coupled with dramatic urban development and agricultural
development. 90 Due to the complexity of the Greater Everglades
Ecosystem and the vast area of land and water encompassed within it,
restoration must take place within the context of extensive state and
federal laws that govern various aspects of natural resource protection. 9 1
Agencies involved in the planning and implementation of restoration
projects must negotiate a labyrinth of complex legal requirements, at
times at odds with each other. 9 2 The most significant and challenging
issues with restoration come into play when two or more federal
environmental laws seemingly clash. Of greatest concern are the
86. The author is a member of the National Academies, National Research Council
Committee on Independent Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Progress. Although this
Article uses Everglades restoration as one of several examples where multiple and sometimes
conflicting statutory objectives have complicated restoration efforts, this Article is not intended to
provide an analysis of legal issues related to Everglades restoration. Similarly, this article is not
intended to attempt to resolve or comment on legal conflicts related to Everglades restoration.
87. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 22-23.
88. Id.
89. See WENDY D. GRAHAM ET AL., OPTIONS TO REDUCE HIGH VOLUME FRESHWATER
FLOWS TO THE ST. LUCIE AND CALOOSAHATCHEE ESTUARIES AND MOVE MORE WATER FROM
LAKE OKEECHOBEE TO THE SOUTHERN EVERGLADES 5-7 (2015).
90. Id. at26.
91. NRC Report 2012, supra note 6, at xi-xii.
92. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("A recent conflict between efforts to protect snail kite nests and
[stormwater treatment area] operations illustrates how single species management could potentially
compromise water management required for system restoration.").
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sometimes-contradictory requirements of the CWA, ESA, and MBTA.
These conflicts are often cited as constraints on restoration.93 Legal
requirements related to restoration efforts have pitted CWA water quality
concerns against overall ecosystem restoration and protection or recovery
of ESA-listed species and MBTA-protected species, protection of
protected species against protection of other species, and protection of
water quality within the Everglades National Park against protection of
estuary and coastal water quality. 94
Everglades restoration is further complicated by the multiple and
diverse objectives of numerous stakeholder groups, including restoring a
functioning ecosystem, providing water for agricultural irrigation,
providing public water supply to an ever-increasing population along the
south Florida coasts, preserving sacred tribal lands and resources utilized
by the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes, and preventing flooding of urban
and agricultural areas.95 It is virtually impossible for any Everglades
restoration plan to optimize all objectives of each of these stakeholders.
Consequently, Everglades restoration efforts have been faced with a series
of roadblocks, in many cases resulting from disparate environmental
statutory or regulatory requirements or from the way courts have
interpreted and implemented these requirements. 96
The most contentious legal issues in Everglades restoration have
involved compliance with water quality standards (WQS) established
under the CWA.97 A conflict arises when compliance with these CWA
requirements may cause a "take" or adversely affect a species or the
habitat of a species listed under the ESA or result in a "take" of a species
protected by the MBTA. These conflicts can arise in a number of
circumstances. Litigation under the CWA resulted in a consent decree and
permit requirements that dictate when and where water can be released
into the Everglades. Too many, too few, or inappropriate timing of water
93. See, e.g., Lance H. Gunderson et al., Regime Shifts and Panarchies in Regional Scale
Social Ecological Water Systems, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y 1, 4 (2017); Lance H. Gunderson et al.,
Escaping a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in the Everglades
Social Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REv. 127, 137 (2014).
94. See Gunderson et al. (2017), supra note 93, at 4; Gunderson et al. (2014), supra note 93,
at 137.
95. GRAHAM ETAL.,supra note 89, at2l.
96. NRC Report 2012, supra note 6, at 32-36.
97. See id. at 35 ("One of the most significant challenges to Everglades restoration is the
inability to distribute treated water from the [stormwater treatment areas] into the Everglades
Protection Area if that water leads to violations of legally mandated water quality standards.").
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releases can adversely impact species, including those protected by the
ESA and MBTA. For example, releasing too much water or impounding
water in certain areas of the Everglades during nesting season can destroy
bird nests and kill or injure hatchlings. In other cases, insufficient water
resulting from CWA compliance activities can harm certain species. 98
The conflicts between the requirements of the CWA, the ESA, and
the MBTA have arisen in several contexts in Everglades restoration. A
significant challenge to progress in restoring the Everglades relates to the
differing objectives and requirements of the ESA and those of the CWA.
The CWA articulates a goal of restoring the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of surface waters. 99 The primary CWA regulatory
program is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting program. NPDES permits are required for any
discharge of a pollutant from a point source into waters of the United
States. 00 NPDES permits must ensure that two types of standards are met:
first, technology-based standards determined by the availability, cost, and
feasibility of existing technology; and second, water quality-based
standards, established by the states to protect designated uses of waters. 0'
Effluent limitations for both types of standards are incorporated into
NPDES permits; an exceedance of a limitation violates the CWA.1 02
Water quality standards and NPDES permit conditions have, in some
circumstances, created potential conflicts with wildlife protection
statutes. The ongoing restoration efforts in Florida's Everglades described
below are illustrative of this issue.
The primary focus of Everglades restoration is to restore the
hydrology of the system to something approaching its pre-drained
condition.1 03 To accomplish that goal, water previously diverted out of the
Everglades must be returned. However, currently, that water is highly
polluted with phosphorus and other pollutants from agricultural run-off
and does not comply with water quality standards established for the
Everglades under the CWA. 104 Restoration of hydrology is critical to
98. Id. at 100-03.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
100. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1)-(5).
101. Id. §§ 1311, 1313.
102. Id. § 1319.
103. See Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat.
2572, 2680-93.
104. See NRC Report 2012, supra note 6, at 113-22, 223-30.
188 [Vol. 38: 165
DISCORDANT ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
recovering populations of endangered and threatened species in the
Everglades.l 0 Many Everglades species, including some threatened and
endangered species, existed prior to the draining of the system. 10 6 Other
species that depend on drier conditions appear to have found new habitat
in the post-drained conditions. Consequently, efforts to restore hydrology
may adversely affect species that have come to rely on the human-created
drier habitat. 1 07
Two significant federal lawsuits brought under the CWA have made
clear -that any water redistributed through the Everglades to promote the
hydrologic restoration of the ecosystem must meet established water
quality standards. In the first of these lawsuits, United States v. South
Florida Water Management District, the United States sued Florida,
alleging that Florida's lack of enforcement of water quality laws
threatened the water quality of Everglades National Park and the
Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge.' 0 8 After much legal wrangling
between the federal and state governmental agencies, the parties reached
a settlement, and, in 1992, approved a complex consent decree that
requires the State of Florida take actions to ensure all discharges to the
Park and the Refuge meet specified phosphorus limitations.1 09 'To
accomplish this requirement, Florida committed to building and operating
thousands of acres of created wetlands, known as Stormwater Treatment
Areas (STAs), and to implementing a regulatory program to reduce
phosphorus waste from the farms that discharge into the Everglades. 110 A
modified consent decree that extends the deadline for compliance with
phosphorus standards from 2002 to 2006 remains in effect and under the
jurisdiction of the court.'" To date, Florida's extensive and costly efforts
to reduce phosphorous levels have not achieved compliance with the
levels set forth in the consent decree.1 2 During this time, some restoration
efforts have stalled because Florida fears violating the consent decree by
105. Id at 22.
106. See id. at 64-66 (identifying the ESA-listed Wood Stork and Snail Kite as species that
are highly dependent on the ecological conditions that were characteristic of the undrained south
Florida landscape).
107. See NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 63-70.
108. Settlement Agreement, United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVLER) [hereinafter "Settlement Agreement"].
109. Id. at 9-11, A-I - A-4.
110. Id. at 17-20.
1l1. Id.
112. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 5.
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discharging water not in compliance with the phosphorous levels into the
Park or Refuge.
The second of the two significant federal lawsuits involved a
challenge to the EPA's approval of Florida's water quality standards. 1 3
In response to a 2012 court order, Florida agreed to expand the STAs to
provide additional water quality treatment. An NPDES permit, which
includes a water quality-based effluent limitation (WQBEL), was issued
for discharges from the STAs to the Everglades.1 14 More than twenty
years of planning have been dedicated to improving water quality through
the construction of STAs costing more than 1.8 billion dollars." 5
Although these efforts have greatly. reduced phosphorous concentrations
in discharges from the STAs, the discharges do not yet comply with the
WQBEL. 116 Until discharges from the STAs are brought into compliance
with water quality standards, most of the Everglades ecosystem will
continue to suffer from being starved of the water that it needs to function
effectively.117 This degradation has adversely affected species ostensibly
protected by both the ESA and the MBTA." 8
An unanticipated byproduct of CWA-required water quality treatment
is that ESA- and MBTA-protected species have nested in the STAs that
Florida constructed to comply with the CWA's water quality standards,
permits, and the consent decree.' 19 Florida has spent more than 1.8 billion
dollars to construct these vast acreages of STAs and associated FEBs,
which are designed to remove phosphorous to ensure compliance with
water quality standards. 120 These areas represent "new wetlands," which
have become nesting grounds for several bird species, including the
endangered Snail Kite and the MBTA-protected Black-Necked Stilt.121
Once these birds build nests in the STAs, the STAs cannot be operated
113. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, No. 04-21448-CIV, 2006 WL
648055 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2006).
114. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 62; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS
TOWARD RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: THE FIFTH BIENNIAL REVIEW 101-02 (2014) (hereinafter
NRC Report 2014).
115. Improving Everglades Water Quality, SOUTH FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST.
https://www.sfwmd.gov/our-work/wq-stas (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
116. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 4-5.
117. NRC Report 2012, supra note 6, at 100-03, 141-46.
118. Id. at 141-46.
119. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 63-66.
120. Improving Everglades Water Quality, supra note 120.
121. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 63.
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normally without flooding the nests, which could be considered a "take"
under the ESA or MBTA.1 22 When a protected species nests in an STA or
FEB, a conflict could arise over whether the STA or FEB must be
managed to protect the species even if such management would result in
less effective water quality treatment.1 23
Concerns about these species nesting in STAs are not merely
theoretical. One or both species nested in all five STAs in 2015, and there
have been as many as 113 Snail Kite nests and 204 Stilt nests in STAs
during recent breeding seasons.1 24 The Black-Necked Stilt constructs its
nests at the end of the dry season in STA cells that contain little or no
water.1 2 5 Normally these cells would naturally refill during the rainy
season, which would destroy any Stilt nests present.1 26 The endangered
Snail Kite, on the other hand, builds its nests during wet years in emergent
vegetation in STAs that contain water of sufficient depth.1 2 7 To nest
successfully, both birds require a suitable rate of water recession; nests
can be destroyed by either too much inflow or too much outflow.1 28
Accordingly, due to ESA and MBTA concerns, the presence of nesting
Stilts or Kites restricts water managers' ability to move water in and out
of STAs to optimize water quality treatment.1 29 Without optimal water
treatment, the rehydration of the Everglades that is necessary for the
restoration of the ecosystem as a whole and for the recovery of other
species will be delayed even further.
Prior to the construction of the STAs, the action agencies consulted
with the FWS under the ESA. However, because the parties did not
anticipate that Snail Kites would nest in the STAs after they were
constructed, the consultation did not address this concern.1 30 As described
above, FWS is not authorized to take Stilts under the MBTA.131
Therefore, to comply with the take prohibitions in both the ESA and
MBTA, the state must operate the STAs in ways that can deviate from
122. Id. at 63-64.
123. Id. at 64.
124. Id. at 63-64.
125. Id at 63.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 63-64.
130. Id. at 64.
131. Id.
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optimal STA operations designed to meet water quality standards. After
it became apparent that Stilts were nesting in STAs, an Avian Protection
Plan 32 was developed to protect the Stilts and provide guidance on
operation of STAs to avoid creating additional nesting habitat that could
create conflicts. Data are not yet available to quantify the extent to which
STA functioning has been affected by operations that have been modified
to protect nests. 1 33
. In addition to creating the specific conflict between species protection
and CWA requirements, Everglades restoration efforts create several
potential conflicts between ecosystem-wide restoration goals and the
habitat requirements of specific protected species.1 34 The greater
Everglades ecosystem has been dramatically altered by past efforts to
drain south Florida land for agriculture and development.'3 " For more than
a half century, much of the formerly wet Everglades has been relatively
dry.1 36 During this long period, species adapted to wet conditions (such as
the Snail Kite) have moved out of previously wet habitat, while species
adapted to drier conditions (such as the Cape Sable Seaside Sparrow) have
moved into drained drier areas.13 7 The primary objective of Everglades
restoration is to restore the hydrology of the system to something close to
its original state before human intervention. 3 8 Meeting this objective will
benefit many species and will improve the ecosystem functions of the
Everglades in general, but restoration may cause harm to those species
already adapted to the altered conditions.1 39
Ultimately, restoration of the Everglades is expected to provide
substantial benefits to populations of a wide range of species, including
listed species, while restoring important ecosystem functions on a vast
scale. Nevertheless, in the course of undertaking certain restoration
projects, including rehydrating some highly drained areas, some species
will suffer. Although restoration may provide sufficient widespread
benefits to justify some harms to select species or resources, complete
132. PANDION SYS., INC., AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN FOR BLACK-NECKED STILTS AND
BURROWING OWLS NESTING IN THE EVERGLADES AGRICULTURAL AREA STORMWATER
TREATMENT AREAS (2007).
133. NRC Report 2016, supra note 27, at 64.
134. NRC Report 2012, supra note 6, at 6.
135. Id. at 19-21.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 63-64.
138. Id. at 22-23.
139. Id.
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restoration will take decades, and there may be transitory effects on
important species and resources.
The potential for conflicts among protected species is demonstrated
by a recent lawsuit alleging that water management practices around
Everglades National Park jeopardize the continued existence of the Cape
Sable Seaside Sparrow, an endangered species currently residing in the
park. The sparrow requires drier habitat than that which existed prior to
drainage of the park. Efforts to restore the park's hydrology to its pre-
drainage condition will benefit the ecosystem and numerous species, but
it will likely negatively impact the sparrow's remaining habitat.
Protecting the sparrow's habitat, on the other hand, will likely negatively
impact the Snail Kite and other protected species, such as the Wood Stork
and the Roseate Spoonbill. Even if a long-term solution that protects all
of these species can be developed, there will likely be negative impacts to
some protected species during the transition from the current conditions
to the restored conditions. For these reasons, the Services issued a
jeopardy finding for "The Everglades Restoration Transition Plan," which
governs this transition period. 14 0
The Everglades example illustrates a particular challenge of large-
scale environmental restoration projects: Environmental protection
statutes often conflict. This is most apparent where more than one species
protected by the ESA or MBTA have different habitat or resource needs.
Where ecosystems have been altered by humans, restoration efforts may
pit species adapted to the altered conditions against species adapted to
pre-alteration conditions. Consequently, attempts to restore habitat for
one species, or for the benefit of the ecosystem as a whole, may
inadvertently harm other protected species., For decades, scientists and
policymakers had advocated multi-species management approaches that
focuses on ecosystems or landscapes rather than on individual species.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has long recommended the use of
multi-species approaches where species are taxonomically-related and
face similar threats or share an ecosystem. 141 Other approaches to multi-
species protection include the umbrella concept, in which conserving the
habitat for one species with a large habitat range will necessarily protect
140. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, EVERGLADES RESTORATION TRANSITION PLAN FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4-53 to -76 (2011).
141. Susan D. Jewell, Multi-Species Recovery Plans, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., May-
June 2000, at 30.
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species with narrower habitats within the wider range.1 42 Another
approach is to protect the species most vulnerable to a particular threat,
under the assumption that species less sensitive to that threat will also be
protected.1 4 3 While these multi-species approaches may be successful in
some situations, scientific research suggests that it is not uncommon for
closely related species to have very different responses to similar threats
or protection efforts.'" Instead,' the most successful multi-species
recovery plans typically involve species that respond similarly to the
threats they face.' 45 Thus, while multi-species biological opinions,
recovery plans, or other environmental management plans may be
effective in some circumstances, they do not contain the tools necessary
to address the challenges of attempting to protect multiple species where
particular action may benefit one species but harm another. This challenge
becomes more profound when managers attempt to restore areas where
human activity has shifted the species composition of a habitat. In this
situation, attempts to restore an ecosystem to its pre-anthropogenic state
could negatively affect the current habitat residence. Even where the
restoration will ultimately provide widespread benefits, individual species
may be harmed, or some species may suffer during the transition period
of the restoration.
III. HARMONIZING THE DISCORDANT
A. Resolution of Conflict in the Courts
Courts are frequently called upon to resolve conflicting statutory
provisions. Applying basic canons of statutory construction, courts may
find that a later statute impliedly repealed a conflicting earlier statute.
However, courts seek to avoid such a reading except where the later
statute clearly contradicts the earlier statute and it is impossible to
interpret the statutes to avoid the conflict.1 46 Courts may also apply a
142. Brain G. Laub & Phaedra Budy, Assessing the Likely Effectiveness of Multispecies
Management for Imperiled Desert Fishes with Niche Overlap Analysis, 29 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2015).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("The courts are not at liberty to
pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective.").
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presumption against absurd results to avoid certain statutory conflicts, but
there is a high threshold for finding absurdity. 147 In many situations,
canons of statutory construction will not be useful, and courts will engage
in more narrowly tailored legal analyses to resolve conflicts.
The ESA applies to all federal agencies regardless of the organic
statute under which they operate or the objectives they seek to achieve.
Thus, since the ESA's inception, environmental regulators and courts
have both struggled with the issue of whether, or to what extent, the ESA
trumps other federal laws. A few federal court decisions, including two
by the U.S. Supreme Court, address the interplay between the ESA and
other federal environmental laws in certain limited circumstances. For
quite some time, federal circuit courts were split on whether the ESA's
consultation and no-jeopardy requirements are absolute and whether they
apply even where a federal agency lacks the authority to comply with
them. Although the ESA provides for no explicit limit on the consultation
requirement, the Services regulations limit ESA consultation to federal
actions "in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or
control."1 4 8 Early decisions by the D.C. Circuit 4 9 and Fifth Circuit5 o
found that Section 7 does not provide authority beyond that provided in
the statute underlying the agency action. The First Circuit' 5 ' and Eighth
Circuit,1 5 2 on the other hand, took the position that the ESA grants
additional authority for federal agencies to comply with the ESA even
where no such authority exists in those agencies' implementing statutes.
147. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that clear statutory language is absurd only where it is
virtually impossible that the absurd interpretation is what Congress intended).
148. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2018).
149. Platte River Whooping Cran Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. F.E.R.C., 962F.2d
27, 34 (D.C.Cir. 1992) ("the statute directs agencies to "utilize their authorities" to carry out the
ESA's objectives; it does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling act."). For
a detailed description of these early cases, see Alicia D. Kisling, Environmental Law - A Tale of
Two Conflicting Mandates: Limiting Agency Authority Under the Endangered Species Act or
Resolution of the Statutotry Overlap?, National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of
Wildlife 127 S.Ct. 2518, 8 WYOMING L. REV. 481, 489-93 (2007) and Sherry L. Bosse, Defenders
of Wildlife v. EPA: Testing the Boundaries of Federal Agency Power Under the ESA, 36 ENVTL L
1025, 1047-54 (2006).
150. Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1998). ("[T]he ESA
serves not as a font of new authority, but as . . . a directive to agencies to channel their existing
authority in a particular direction.").
151. Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st
Cir. 1979).
152. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989).
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In the 2004 Washington Toxics Coalition case described above, the Ninth
Circuit addressed this issue in the context of the different standards in the
ESA and FIFRA. The court found that, while the ESA and FIFRA have
different purposes and different metrics, EPA could not ignore its
responsibilities under the ESA simply "because it is bound to comply with
another statute that has consistent, complementary objectives." 1 53
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of an agency's
consultation authority in the context of the ESA and CWA. In National
Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife (NAHB), 1 54 the
Court decided the narrow issue of whether the EPA was. required to
consult with the FWS under the ESA in determining whether to delegate
the CWA's NPDES program to the State of Arizona. On its face, the ESA
requires consultation for any federal action that may affect listed species,
while the CWA provides that EPA "shall" transfer NPDES authority to a
state provided that the state meets nine specific criteria enumerated in the
CWA. The Court upheld the services position in holding that,
notwithstanding the ESA's clear mandate, consultation is only required
for discretionary agency actions.' 5 5 The specific issue in the case was
whether the EPA, in determining whether to delegate the NPDES
authority to a state, was required to undergo Section 7 consultation. The
Court described the conflict between the CWA, which requires that EPA
"shall" delegate the NPDES program to a state provided that the state
meets nine specifically articulated criteria, and the ESA, which contains
consultation and no-jeopardy requirements, as a "clash of seemingly
categorical-and, at first glance, irreconcilable-legislative
comments."l 56 The Court noted that requiring EPA to undergo
consultation when deciding whether to delegate a program would, in
essence "repeal the mandatory and exclusive list" of nine criteria found in
the CWA and replace it with a new list that includes the ESA's Section 7
consultation requirements.' 5 7 The Court applied the presumption against
implied repeals unless explicitly provided by statute. In reaffirming this
presumption, the Court did not find it compelling that the ESA was
enacted after the pertinent provision of the CWA.15 8 Further, the Court
153. Wash. Toxics Coal., 413 F.3d at 1032.
154. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
155. Id. at 672-73.
156. Id. at 661.
157. Id. at 662.
158. Id. at 662-64.
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expressed the broader concerns that reading Section 7 of the ESA to trump
all federal nondiscretionary actions would potentially override every
federal statute that mandates agency action.'1 9 Accordingly, the Court
found the Section 7 services regulation applies only to federal actions in
which there is discretionary federal involvement or control, to
harmonizing the ESA and CWA's requirements to "guide agencies'
existing discretionary authority, but not read[] it to override express
statutory mandates." 60
As others have noted, the circuit split that existed prior to 2007
involved two different situations. The courts that held that the ESA does
not confer additional power on federal agencies to comply with the ESA
Section 7 requirements were asked to decide the issue under statutes that
provided limited discretion or no discretion to the agencies. In contrast,
the courts that found the ESA did confer such additional powers addressed
the issue in the context of statutes that authorize a federal agency to
consider effects on listed species or provide broad discretionary authority
to the agency. When considering apparent conflicts between the ESA and
other statutes, such as the CWA, FIFRA, or the MBTA, one must
determine the extent to which the agency has discretionary authority to
comply with the ESA. In making this determination, it is necessary to
consider the specific statutory language governing the agency action. In
NAHB, EPA's authority under the specific section of the CWA left no
room for consideration of endangered species. Other statutes and other
provisions of the CWA may .provide more discretion, or at least are not
unambiguously nondiscretionary. This is where things become more
complicated.
Courts addressing this issue after NAHB have tended to limit the
application of the case to, as Sandra Zellmer describes, "those rare
occasions where compliance with both section 7 consultation
requirements and the statutory provision in question would be
impossible." 1 61 One post-NAHB example explored by Sandra Zellmer
occurred in 2008, when the State of Missouri refused to issue a CWA
water quality certification' 62 that was required before the U.S. Army
159. Id. at 664.
160. Id at 666.
161. Sandra Zellmer, Mudslinging on the Missouri: Can Endangered Species Survive the
Clean Water Act?, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 89, 109 (2011). See also Malori Dahmen, Note, CWA
and ESA: Nine Is a Party, Ten Is a Crowd-National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007), 29 ENERGY L.J. 703, 709 (2008).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
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Corps of Engineers could proceed with a habitat restoration plan
compelled by an ESA BiOp. Zellmer asserts that, given the similar
environmental protection goals of the CWA and the ESA, compliance
with the CWA "should complement, not displace, an agency's duties
under the ESA."l 63
After NAHB, an agency's statutory mandate can be very clear-cut if a
specific list of statutory criteria (not including ESA compliance) is met.1 64
However, NAH-B provides little or no guidance in many harder cases
where the agency's statutory authority and the extent of its discretion are
less clear. In situations where seemingly conflicting federal statutes
contain flexibility mechanisms or provide discretion to implementing
agencies, the interplay is murkier and can turn on the federal agency's
interpretation of laws, its willingness to employ flexibility mechanisms,
and its willingness to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
The NAHB case and the WTC case can be distinguished by the
language of the relevant CWA and FIFRA provisions. Section 402(b) of
the CWA sets forth an exclusive list of criteria that must be met for EPA
to approve a transfer of permitting authority to a state. None of these
specified criteria relate to whether an action will jeopardize listed species.
Thus, the Court in that case rejected the argument that in applying the
criteria, EPA had the authority to impose a completely new criterion
addressing potential impacts to listed species. The WTC Court, on the
other hand, recognized that, while FIFRA does not expressively mandate
that EPA give special consideration to listed species, it does require EPA
to consider impacts to wildlife, which would necessarily include listed
species. Thus, FIFRA registration decisions are an example of where an
agency has discretionary authority to address impacts to listed species and
accordingly must comply with ESA.
Court decisions that attempt to reconcile discordant environmental
statutes have been less than satisfying. In some cases, statutory
construction can resolve a matter; where it would be impossible to comply
with both ESA requirements and another statute's requirements, the
answer is clear. In most cases, it is not impossible to comply with both,
but it is often challenging. Courts have recognized that ESA and other
environmental statutes can complement each other, but they have not
tackled the difficult issue of how this would actually work, what
environmental objectives should have priority, or what principles should
163. Zellmer, supra note 161, at 108.
164. Id. at 111.
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guide agencies in determining whether or how to implement statutory
flexibility. Multi-objective optimization can help answer these questions.
B. Multi-Objective Optimization
Multi-objective optimization is a type of multi-criteria decision-
making-an established method used to evaluate multiple conflicting
criteria in decision-making. In general, multi-criteria decision-making
provides a structured framework that guides decision-makers in complex
matters involving multiple criteria. The process involves gathering
information from stakeholders, establishing what criteria will be used to
judge alternative solutions, determining the relative importance of each
criterion, and ultimately deciding on the best alternative solution. 165 Using
this approach ensures stakeholder involvement and transparent decision-
making. Perhaps more importantly, this approach requires thoughtful, up-
front crafting of criteria to judge alternatives, and the relative weight to
afford each criterion. Because environmental decision-making inevitably
involves tradeoffs between multiple objectives, 166 a body of scientific
literature has proposed a variety of processes and mathematical models
designed to address multiple objectives. 1 6 7
Multi-objective optimization takes multi-criteria decision-making a
step further by striving to optimize the multiple objectives associated with
a problem, typically through mathematical modeling. Multi-objective
optimization is an approach that has been used for many years in the
business and engineering worlds as a way to find optimal solutions to
problems that involve multiple objectives. In this context, optimization
165. Igor Linkov ct al., From Optimization to Adaptation: Shifting Paradigms in
Environmental Management and Their Application to Remedial Decisions, 2 INTEGRATED ENVTL.
ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 92, 95 (2006).
166. Gregory A. Kiker et al., Application ofMulitcriteria Decision Analysis in Environmental
Decision Making, 1 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 95 (2005).
167. See, e.g., Jurgen Branke & Kalyanmoy Deb, Integrating User Preferences into
Evolutionary Multi-Objective Optimization, in KNOWLEDGE INCORPORATION IN EVOLUTIONARY
COMPUTATION (Y. Jin, ed., 2005); Matteo Convertino et al., Enhanced Adaptive Management:
Integrating Decision Analysis, Scenario Analysis and Environmental Modeling for the Everglades,
3 SC. REP. 2922 (2013); Lucien Duckstein & Serafim Opricovic, Multiobjective Optimization in
River Basin Development, 16 WATER RESOURCES RES. 14 (1980); Robin Gregory & Katharine
Wellman, Bringing Stakeholder Values Into Environmental Policy Choices: A Community-Based
Estuary Case Study, 39 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 37 (2001); Maureen C. Kennedy et al., Informed Multi-
Objective Decision-Making in Environmental Management Using Pareto Optimality, 45 J. OF
APPLIED ECOLOGY 181 (2008); Kiker et al., supra note 166; Lothar Thicle et al., A Preference-
Based Evolutionary Algorithm for Multi-Objective Optimization, EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
17(3): 411-436 (2009).
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means identifying the best alternative solution to a problem within an
identified set of constraints. Multi-objective optimization provides a
structured process for making decisions to optimize multiple objectives.
A number of mathematical methods have been developed to optimize
multiple objectives.1 68 Despite the evolution of sophisticated multi-
objective decision-making models, the literature has not yet grappled with
the problem of decision-making where multiple environmental statutes
are discordant, either on their face, as interpreted and applied by
implementing agencies, or as imposed by courts. This article posits that
the basic concept of multi-objective optimization can provide a
framework for optimizing multiple legal objectives, even in the absence
of quantitative data and sophisticated mathematical modeling.1 69
1. The basic mechanics of multi-objective optimization
There are numerous methods to apply MOO in different situations, as
well as a variety of mathematical tools that have been developed for
quantitative MOO analysis. The basic structure of MOO, however,
involves a step-by-step, pre-determined methodology that guides the
decision-making process. Each step has its own information needs, with
varying degrees of stakeholder and public input. To address multiple
statutory objectives that do not focus on quantitative analysis, a MOO
analysis could include the following steps:
Step 1: Define and identify multiple desired objectives
Having a clearly identified and articulated set of objectives is a critical
first step in all MOO analyses. Examples of objectives could be
protection of endangered species (ESA), improved water quality (CWA),
registration of pesticides that do not pose unreasonable adverse effects
and play important roles in agriculture or public health piotection
(FIFRA), protection of migratory birds (MBTA), and any other economic
and social factors required to be considered by statute. Identification of
all-pertinent criteria requires careful analysis of all relevant environmental
168. See, e.g., Ciara Pike-Burke, Multi-Objective Optimization, STOR601: Research Topic
I, https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/pg/pikeburc/reportl.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
169. This article does not focus on mathematical modeling tools needed to conduct
quantitative multi-objective optimization. That discussion is left in the capable hands of the many
modelers who undertake such work. Although ultimately development of quantitative analytics for
multi-objective optimization in the legal context may prove Valuable, this article focuses on a
qualitative approach to the process
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statutes and regulations. Because statutory and regulatory interpretations
can vary, input from agencies charged with implementing each statute
must be considered, as well as input from affected stakeholders. Other
scholars have written extensively about the necessity of identifying and
including all stakeholders in a meaningful way to ensure the "objectives"
sought to be reached are clearly identified and have obtained some level
of approval from stakeholders. 1 70
Step 2: Define a set of criteria essential for the attainment of
desired objectives
Simply identifying and articulating the multiple objectives is not
enough--decide up front what criteria will be used to measure the
attainment of the desired objectives. For example, if improved water
quality is one objective, it is necessary to determine how much water
quality improvement will be needed to meet this objective. Moreover,
protocols must exist for when, where, and how water quality will be
sampled and measured. Having clear criteria in place helps ensure that
there will be agreement as to when objectives are met. This stage requires
significant input from experts, for example water quality scientists, who
understand how to measure compliance.
Step 3: Develop a range ofalternative solutions
Developing alternative solutions to solve the problem should involve
input from stakeholders, the general public, technical experts, and agency
personnel. Suggestion of creative solutions should be encouraged.
Unworkable or less-than-optimal solutions can be screened out at later
stages. Considerable literature exists on how to involve the public in
developing alternative solutions, as well as how to encourage the
development of creative solutions by convening processes that encourage
creative brainstorming and withhold criticism and judgment until after
potential alternative solutions have been identified.
Step 4: Determine which alternative solutions are Pareto
optimal
Once a wide range of alternative solutions has been developed, it is
necessary to screen out solutions that are not Pareto optimal, so that the
170. Gregory & Wellman, supra note 172, at 52.
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weighting and optimization steps are focused on options that have already
been determined to be Pareto optimal. As illustrated above, for complex
multi-objective problems, there is no one single solution that
simultaneously optimizes every objective.17 ' Therefore, the goal is to find
solutions that optimize multiple objectives to the greatest extent possible.
In most complex cases, there could be numerous, if not infinite, options
that optimize objectives in different ways. The long-recognized approach
to generate tradeoff solutions is the use of Pareto optimal solutions. One
step of multi-objective optimization, therefore, is filtering out options to
leave only those that are Pareto optimal-also referred to as non-
dominated solutions.1 72 A solution is Pareto optimal if it is not possible to
improve any one objective without coincidentally degrading another
objective. 173 In the absence of other preference information (e.g., it is
more important to a purchaser to have a safe car than a comfortable car),
all Pareto optimal solutions are considered to be equally good solutions.1 7 4
The use of the set of Pareto optimal solutions, also known as the
Pareto frontier, implicitly treats options that are not Pareto optimal as
infeasible.' 75 While the literature on MOO calls for the identification of
Pareto optimal solutions, it is important to recognize that in complex
systems there may be circumstances under which it is valuable to consider
options that are not Pareto optimal (e.g., an option that increases the
population of one species while causing takes of individuals of another
species), but are still legally permissible through a mechanism such as an
incidental take authorization. Such options may ultimately be shown to
be preferred solutions after the weighting or prioritization factors are
applied.1 7 6 Once Pareto optimal solutions are identified, it is necessary to
make tradeoffs or impose subjective preferences of the decision-maker to
identify the best solution or solutions.
171. Thicle et al., supra note 167, at 411.
172. Jurgen Branke & Kalyanmoy Deb, Integrating User Preferences into Evolutionary
Multi-Objective Optimization, in KNOWLEDGE INCORPORATION IN EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
461-62 (Yaochu Jin ed., 2005).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Duckstein & Opricovic, supra note 167, at 15.
176. This approach, often referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, has less stringent criteria
than does Pareto optimality in that it allows for solutions that may make some objectives worse off
as compared to the status quo. See generally Oxford Reference, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, http://
www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100028833 (last visited August 20,
2018).
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Step 5: Apply policy-based weighting factors
One challenge of applying this decision-making structure is
determining the objectives, and perhaps most importantly, the weighting
or prioritization factors that will determine the ultimate outcome. Each of
these involves value judgments and policy considerations that go far
beyond strict scientific or legal analysis. Policy decisions are not merely
a scientific matter, but include value judgements.177 Thus, for MOO to be
successful, it must integrate values of affected stakeholders.17 8
Stakeholder input in identifying values and priority perspectives is critical
to establishing weighting factors to use in the multi-objective
optimization process. 179
Step 6: Use mathematical methods to determine which solutions
are closet to idealfor each criterion
Mathematical methodology is beyond the scope of this article and the
expertise of this author. However, it should be noted that numerous
mathematical methods exist that can assist in identifying which solutions
are closest to the ideal for each criterion. For example, Duckstein and
Opricovic discuss algorithms that can be used to assist in identifying
optimal solutions. They propose one algorithm, Compromise
Programming, which finds solutions that are the closest by a measure of
distance to the ideal one.18 0
Step 7: Choose the "optimal" solution
Steps 1-6 should result in the identification of one or more optimal
solutions that optimize compliance with the multiple identified weighted
objectives as judged against predetermined criteria. At this point, if one
clear optimal solution is found, that is the end of the inquiry. If more than
one optimal solution is identified, it is ultimately up to the decision-maker
to decide among the optimal solutions. Using this step-by-step approach
177. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural
Resource Regulation, 26 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 1, 8-16 (2005) (discussing the
differences between scientific and policy judgments).
178. Kiker et al., supra note 166, at 103-104; see also Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future:
The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 260-261 (2003)
(discussing the importance of a robust public discussion of values in environmental law).
179. Id. at 42.
180. Duckstein & Opricovic, supra note 167, at 16.
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should provide a level of transparency and confidence in the system that
should provide some level of comfort to affected stakeholder.
2. The role multi-objective optimization can play in environmental
decision-making
In general, a multi-objective optimization decision-making approach
would involve the following steps:
Perhaps nowhere than in environmental decision-making is there a
greater need for a structure approach to optimize multiple objectives.
Kiker et al. explain that most environmental decisions are "complex and
multifaceted and involve many stakeholders with different priorities or
objectives - presenting exactly the type of problem that behavioral
research has shown humans are poorly equipped to solve unaided."' 8'
Typically, decision-makers lack a structured approach to address
complexity and fall back on intuition or heuristics.1 82 In the absence of a
structural framework for decision-making in the face of multiple
conflicting objectives, environmental decision makers are forced to use
an ad hoc approach.
Using an ad hoc approach, a decision-maker considers factors such as
statutory objectives, stakeholder values, scientific data, and economic and
other social considerations in deciding how to proceed on a particular
policy matter. Even where the decision-maker attempts to gather good
information from all stakeholders, there is nothing to guide the decision-
maker on how to take all of the information and competing objectives into
account to make the optimal decision. With a structured process to
follow, the decision-maker may tend to go with her gut feeling or let her
own implicit biases influence the decisions she ultimately makes without
even being aware that she is doing so. Equally important, stakeholders
and the general public may feel as though decisions are being made in a
black box and that their input is being ignored. MOO can provide both
the structured approach and the transparency necessary to avoid these
perils.
MOO requires decision-making to follow a clear process and, after
gathering necessary information, to clearly articulate the objectives to be
optimized, the criteria to be used in judging whether or to what extent
objectives are being met, and the policy choices that determine the relative
181. Kiker et al., supra note 166, at 95.
182. Id. at 95.
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weight to afford each objective. The process provides opportunity for
input at each stage and for the transparency that may provide reassurance
to stakeholders and the public. Ad hoc decision-making may not achieve
optimal results and does not assure consistency or instill confidence in
stakeholders.
The basic concept of attempting to optimize multiple objectives is
illustrated by the everyday example of a consumer deciding what type of
car to purchase. A consumer with very limited means may have one
primary objective - finding the car with the lowest price tag. In this single
criterion situation, optimization is simple: the optimal solution is the car
with the lowest price, and multi-objective optimization principles are
irrelevant. Most decisions, however, are more complex and involve
multiple objectives. Even with the decision of which car to purchase,
while a good price will certainly be an important objective for most
purchasers, a number of other objectives may be equally or even more
important. A particular purchaser might have the following objectives: 1.
Price within a certain range; 2. Fuel efficiency within a certain range; 3.
High safety rating; 4. Comfortable ride; 5. Advanced electronic features;
and 6. Aesthetics. Some of these objectives, such as cost range and fuel
efficiency range may be easily quantifiable. Other objectives such as
aesthetics and comfort are not as easily quantified. Moreover, some
objectives, perhaps safety in this example, may be more important to the
purchaser than others, perhaps advanced electronics. Thus, the question
becomes, when faced with a decision with multiple objectives, some
quantifiable and some not, some more important to the decision-maker
than others, how does the decision-maker make an "optimal" choice? For
this example, when deciding between a Honda and a Lexus, where the
Honda has a lower price, higher fuel efficiency, and similar safety rating
as the Lexus, but is less comfortable and less aesthetically appealing to
the purchaser than the Lexus, how can the purchaser make an optimal
decision?
Optimizing multiple objective becomes even more challenging where
two or more of these objectives are in conflict with each other. For
example, in developing an air quality regulation, the objective of attaining
maximum reduction in air pollution emissions may be in direct conflict
with the objective of minimizing costs to industry. Environmental law has
long grappled with the role economic considerations should play vis-a-vis
environmental concerns. Virtually every federal environmental law
provides direction on how these conflicts are to be resolved. While some
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environmental statutes, such as FIFRAl 83 and the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 184  employ a cost-benefit balances approach, most
environmental statutes, including the CWA, 85 the Clean Air Act,1 86 and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'8 7 and the Safe Drinking
Water Act' 8 direct the Environmental Protection Agency to establish
performance standards based on a feasibility approach, where costs are
considered but not necessarily determinative.' 9 The greater challenge
occurs where one statute's environmental objectives conflict with another
statute's related, but different, environmental objectives. These multi-
objective problems are more complex and require different approaches
than those used to solve simpler optimization problems.
Successful resolution of complex environmental problems is not
likely to be achieved without consideration of multiple, at times
conflicting, objectives. In addition to conflicting objectives regarding
environmental benefit and economic cost, there may be competing
environmental benefits or other societal objectives at play. Even where
objectives do not directly conflict with each other, objectives may be
competing for the same limited economic or natural resources.
Optimization in these multi-objective situations necessarily require
tradeoffs or compromises among objectives. Environmental agencies
have developed tools to analyze proposed alternatives based on costs and
benefits.1 90 In fact, since the early 1980's, Executive Orders have directed
federal agencies to engage in cost benefit analysis for all significant
regulatory actions. 191 Environmental objectives may also be in conflict.
For example, under some circumstances, protecting habitat for threatened
183. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012).
184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2012).
185. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387(2012).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2012).
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2012).
189. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 14 (2003).
190. Kiker et al., supra note 166, at 101.
191. The first Executive Order requiring cost-benefit analysis was Executive Order 12291
issued by President.Reagan in 1981. Exec. Order No..12,291, 48 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
Since then, every President has required some version ofa cost-benefit analysis on regulatory action.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), which was amended by
President George W. Bush in Executive Orders 13422 and 13535. See Exec. Order No. 13,563 76
Fed. Reg. 3821, 3823 (Jan. 18, 2011);, Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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and endangered species may conflict with efforts to minimize pollution
run-off by clearing areas to construct water treatment ponds.
The scholarly literature on environmental decision-making is rich and
contains a multitude of decision-making models to assist with choosing
between, for example, environmental restoration options against the
backdrop of multiple objectives. For years, most environmental agencies
relied primarily on approaches in which their decision-making was based
on a comparison of a small number of alternatives using one or two
factors. For example, decisions based on weighing the costs (typically
economic) and benefits (environmental, social, and economic) of a
particular environmental regulation. Over time, some agencies have
developed more formalized systematic and analytics for considering
multiple objectives in their decision-making. Multi-criteria decision
analysis has been employed in several environmental policy decision-
making processes, including environmental remedial technology
selection; environmental impact assessments; and natural resources
management. Scientific scholars that have 'surveyed the use of multi-
criteria analysis by environmental agencies have suggested the use of
multi-criteria decision-making approaches to specific contexts such as
estuary policy initiatives,1 92 everglades restoration, 193 and water resources
development.1 94 Scholars have surveyed the use of multi-criteria decision
analysis by federal agencies in environmental decision-making and have
found that some individual agencies are incorporating formal decision-
making tools, such as multi-criteria decision analysis, into their decision-
making process.1 95 These efforts are modest and do not address problems
with multiple statutes, multiple regulatory agencies, and court
intervention.
To date, legal scholarship on multi-objective decision-making has
been modest at best. 'Despite the dearth of legal literature on multi-
objective decision-making, in recent years legal scholars have grapple
with the complexity of environmental problems in distinct but related
ways. Two commonly-cited barriers to successful environmental
protection are statutory rigidity, with its concomitant regulatory
ossification, 196 and the failure of most environmental laws to address the
192. Gregroy & Wellman, supra note 167, at 39.
193. Convertino et al., supra note 167, at 2922.
194. Duckstein & Opricovic, supra note 167, at 19.
195. Kiker et al, supra note 166, at 101.
196. See generally Thomas 0 McGarity, Some Thoughts On "Deossifying" The Rulemaking
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complex nature of environmental problems that often involve intricate
systems and occur on large scales. Legal scholars have begun to look at
ways to employ system-based approaches to resolving environmental
problems.
For decades scientists have promoted the idea of "adaptive
management," which has been described as "integrat[ing] environmental
with economic and social understanding at the very beginning of the
process, in a sequence of steps during the design phase and after
implementation."' 9 7  Adaptive management shares some characteristics
of multi-objective decision-making in that it calls for both an integration
of environmental, economic and social concerns and it requires a
structured, up-front process that contemplates feedback loops to
incorporate new data gleaned from the experience and experimentation.
In more recent years, legal scholars have extended the concept of
scientific adaptive management to argue for more adaptive forms of
governance that adjust to changing circumstances or new information
more readily than the difficult to modify statutes, regulations, and policies
that permeate modern environmental law.1 98 Scholarly discourse has
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (describing the problem of regulatory ossification); Thomas 0
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75
TEX. L. REv. 525 (1997) (discussing the role of judicial review in the ossification of agency
rulemaking).
197. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT I (C.S. Holling ed.,
John Wiley & Sons 1978); Carl Walters, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
(Macmillan Publishing Company 1986); Jonathan Z. Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund:
Thinking like a Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 561 (2005); J. B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive
Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249,
1250 (2004); See, e.g., John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive
Management: Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816 (2001);
Alfred R. Light, Tales of the Tamiami Trail: Implementing Adaptive Management in Everglades
Restoration, 22 J. LAND USE & ENTL. L. 59 (2006); Bryan G. Norton, The Rebirth of
Environmentalism as Pragmatic, Adaptive Management, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353 (2005); J.B. Ruhl,
Regulation by Adaptive Management - Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 21 (2005); Julie
Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibium View of Ecosystems Mandates
Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (2006); Joy B. Zedlcr, Adaptive Management ofCoastal
Ecosystems Designed to Support Endangered Species, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 735 (1997).
198. Barbara A. Cosens, Lance Gunderson & Brain C. Chaffin, Introduction to the Special
Feature Practicing Panarchy: Assessing Legal Flexibility, Ecological Resilience, and Adaptive
Governance in Regional Water Systems Experiencing Rapid Environmental Change, 23 ECOLOGY
& SOC'Y, 2018, at Article 4; Barbara A. Cosens et al., The Role ofLaw in Adaptive Governance, 22
ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, 2017, at Article 30; Convertino ct al., supra note 167; Robin K. Craig et al.,
Balancing Stability and Flexibility in Adaptive Governance: An Analysis of Tools Available in U.S.
Environmental Law, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y 3 (2017); Daniel A. DeCaro et al., Legal and
Institutional Foundations ofAdaptive Environmental Governance, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, 2017, at
Article 32; Daniel A. DcCaro ct al., Understanding and Applying Principles of Social Cognition
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centered on the concept of finding ways for the law to be less rigid and
more adaptive to better take into account the dynamic nature of
ecosystems, changing circumstances, such as from climate change, or new
understandings of ecological systems. Adaptive governance addresses
shareholder identification of objectives, decision-making, and actions to
meet those objectives. 199 Inclusion of all stakeholders is critical to
achieving a governance system that can address economic,
environmental, social, and political shifts. 2 00 Proponents of adaptive
governances maintain that current environmental governance structures
tend to be static; without introducing more flexibility into such systems,
they will not be able to adapt to changes in social-economic systems. 20 1
Rigid environmental laws can create roadblocks to the types of changes
necessary to address quickly-changing circumstances, such as with
climate changes.202 MOO can be used as a tool of adaptive management.
MOO incorporates many principles of adaptive governance including
stakeholder input to identify priorities and flexibility to overcome
artificial barriers created by rigid adherence to the status quo.
Related to the concept of adaptive management and adaptive
governance is the concept of resilience. Ecological resilience has been
described as a measure of the amount of change or disruption that an
ecological system can withstand without crossing a threshold that causes
the system to flip to a different state. 203 In many cases, human
perturbations such as through pollutant loading or habitat destruction
cause an ecosystem to cross that threshold and be transformed into a less
desirable state. A common example is nutrient loading into a lake that
and Decision Making in Adaptive Environmental Governance, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, 2017 at
ARTICLE 33; Hannah Gosnell et al., Transforming (Perceived) Rigidity In Environmental Law
Through Adaptive Governance: A Case Of Endangered Species Act Implementation, 22 ECOLOGY
& SOC'Y, 2017, at Article 42; Lance H. Gunderson et al., Escaping the Rigidity Trap: Governance
and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in the Everglades Social Ecological System, 51 IDAHO
L. REV. 127 (2014).
199. Craig et al., supra note 198.
200. DeCaro et al., Legal and Institutional Foundations of Adaptive Environmental
Governance, supra note 198.
201. Id. at 3-6.
202. Cosens et al., supra note 198.
203. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 197; Garry
Peterson, Contagious Disturbance and Ecological Resilience, 216 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Florida) (contrasting ecological resilience with engineering resilience,
which is defined as "the rate at which a system returns to a single steady or cyclic state following a
perturbation").
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causes the lake to become eutrophic and become algae-clogged.2 04 As
with adaptive management, legal scholars have extrapolated the concept
of resilience and applied it to legal and governance structures. 20 5 These
approaches often take the form of looking at the overall resilience of a
particular ecosystem as opposed to merely focusing on one ecosystem
attribute, such as a particular species. As with adaptive governance, MOO
can serve as a tool of governance resilience in that it inherently does not
focus on single ecosystem attribute, but instead looks system-wide to
consider how best to optimize multiple objectives. Although legal
scholarship on adaptive governance and resilience has made significant
contributions to the field of environmental management, restoration, and
regulation and inherently encompasses some aspects of multi-criteria
decision-making, it has not squarely addressed a process for making
decisions when multiple statutory objectives or requirements are
discordant. The proposal to adopt MOO methodology contributes and
builds on existing scholarly discourse regarding adaptive and resilient
governance by providing a pragmatic and systematic approach for
resolving these discordances.
IV. USING MULTI-OBJECTWE OPTIMIZATION: A FICTIONAL EXAMPLE
As can be seen from the examples above, there are many real-world
situations where discordant environmental laws containing conflicting
objectives have created significant challenges in accomplishing
environmental protection or restoration goals. For purposes of this article,
a fictional case study demonstrates how multiple objective optimization
might be used to resolve these types of conflicts. 2 06 The case study used
is loosely based on the Everglades example; however, the case study facts
are different from the facts of the Everglades restoration project and the
case study is greatly simplified for the purposes of illustration. It is not
204. Craig R. Allen et al., Quantifying Uncertainty and Trade-Offs in Resilience Assessments,
23 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, 2018, at Article 3, 1; Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Legal
Adaptation and Ecological Resilience, 87 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 950 (2009).
205. Allen et al., supra note 204; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold et al., Cross-Interdisciplinary
Insights into Adaptive Governance and Resilience, 22 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y, 2017, at Article 14;
Cosens, supra note 198.
206. This fictional scenario is loosely based on a large-scale restoration project which shares
some characteristics similar to those in the Everglades. However, the scenario is fictional and over-
simplified and is intended merely to demonstrate the process of multi-objective optimization. The
actual issues related to Everglades restoration and other large-scale restoration projects are far more
complex and nuanced.
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intended to provide any specific legal advice or guidance on the complex
challenges facing Everglades restoration.
In this fictional case study, an ecosystem restoration project is
proposed in an area that has historically been altered by human activity.
Parts of the system have been drained and water has been diverted from
the system for other uses, leaving historic wetlands dry. To restore the
ecosystem, it is necessary to reestablish historic hydrology by both
reversing drainage and restoring water flow to the area. Several
environmental laws are invoked in the restoration project. With regard to
the specific circumstances of this project, there are conflicting objectives
among the various environmental statutes. To restore water flow to the
system, it is necessary to add water from agricultural and urban areas that
are now contaminated with various human contaminants. The CWA
prohibits discharges of the contaminated water to the natural wetland
areas unless EPA-approved water quality standards are met. Currently the
water quality standards cannot be met and efforts to improve water quality
to the point of compliance with strict water quality standards may take
large amounts of money and decades to accomplish.
The wetland area to be restored is historic habitat for a species of
mammal, which will be referred to as species "A." This species requires
a minimal depth of water for a large portion of the year. The drainage and
other alterations that have occurred to the system have caused drying and
deterioration of the wetlands to the point that they are no longer gbod
habitat for species A. Due to widespread wetland destruction and
degradation throughout the geographic area, species A's population has
plummeted, and it has been listed as an endangered species under the
ESA. The second species, a bird species, which will be referred to as
species "B," is not threatened or endangered. This species requires habitat
that is significantly drier than the ideal habitat for species A. Species B
currently occurs in significant numbers within the habitat to be restored.
However, due to its historically wet condition, this area to be restored was
not within the historic range of species B. This species is not currently
listed under the ESA but is protected by the MBTA. The wetland was not
within the historic range of species B, because historically it was too wet
to support the habitat needs for the species. Over the past decades during
which the area was drained by human activity, bird species B has
established nesting grounds within the area to be restored. This fictional
case study sets up a conflict between compliance with the CWA, the ESA,
and the MBTA. If sufficient water is not restored to the habitat, species
A, a listed species, may go extinct. To restore water to the habitat,
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however, is not currently possible without violating the CWA requirement
that EPA-approved water quality standards be met. If water is restored to
the system, species B could be harmed to the extent that, not only might
there be violations of the MBTA, but its population numbers may decline
to the point where it qualifies for listing under the ESA. Under any
scenario, a possible violation of at least one environmental statute will
occur.
If there were no flexibility or opportunities for creative interpretation
or other discretionary action within the statutes at issue, there would be a
stalemate. Under such a stalemate, the status quo might be maintained, in
which case the habitat would not be restored and Species A, a listed
species, would suffer and could become extinct. This outcome might
occur due to bureaucratic inertia and unwillingness to deal with the
conflict or because an environmental group brings a citizen's suit under
the CWA. The mere risk of a lawsuit under the CWA or MBTA may be
sufficient to deter or delay restoration efforts. Another possible outcome
is that the agencies in charge of restoration could decide to move forward
with the restoration without full compliance with the CWA, due to the
imminent threat to species A and the necessity of restoring hydrology to
the wetland area. Without any statutory flexibility or agency discretion,
this problem appears to be intractable.
Before conducting a MOO analysis, a screening step occurs to
determine if there is statutory flexibility or if statutory requirements are
absolute and there is no way to craft a solution that could meet objectives
of the three statues without violating the law. The question then becomes
which solution is optimal.
Step 1: Define and identify multiple desired objectives
If we assume that some flexibility and discretion exist that allow
solutions that do not violate the law, the first step is to identify the
objectives based on the three statutes. In this scenario the objectives are:
(1) Restore the degraded ecosystem; (2) Meet water quality standards; (3)
Protect species A and its habitat; and (4) Protect species B and its habitat.
Economic feasibility could be an additional objective.
Step 2: Define a set of criteria essential for the attainment of
desired objectives
The next step involves defining a set of criteria necessary to measure
whether desired objectives are being met. In this fictional scenario, these
212 [Vol. 38: 165
DISCORDANT ENIRONMENTAL LAWS
criteria could include: (1)_Specified hydrologic conditions and ecological
community structure that represent a restored ecosystem; (2) A specific
water quality concentration that represents compliance with a water
quality standard promulgated under the CWA; (3) Specified population
of Species A; (4) Specified population of Species B; and (5) Costs within
a specified acceptable range.
Step 3: Develop a range ofalternative solutions
A range of alternative solutions designed to address the issues could
include: (1) No action; (2) Restore hydrology before water quality
improvements have been made; (3) Delay hydrologic restoration until
after water quality improvements have been made; (4) Focus resources
on improving water quality and restoring hydrology in one-half of the
area, leaving the other half in the status quo; and (5) Restore hydrology in
limited geographic locations as water quality in those areas is improved
and continue to expand areas of restored hydrology as more water quality
improvements are made. There are a potentially infinite number of other
solutions that could be identified.
Step 4: Determine which alternative solutions are pareto
optimal
The fourth step would be to identify a range of Pareto optimal
solutions. Solutions that would result in a violation of an absolute
statutory requirement for which there is no statutory flexibility
mechanism or agency discretion permitted would have been screened out
from consideration at Step 1 and would not make it to the list of Pareto
optimal solutions. The various alternative solutions identified in Step 3
will be filtered out at this point. For example, Option 1, the no action
option, would not be Pareto optimal because it will result in increased
harm to species A. Also, Option 2 of restoring hydrology prior to water
quality improvements most likely would not be Pareto optimal because it
will further degrade the ecosystem though water quality impacts and will
destroy habitat for species B.
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Objectives Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Restore Ecosystem 0 ++ +
Hydrology
Water Quality ++++ ++ +++
Species A 0 ++ ++
Species B + + _____ ++ +++ _
Costs + ++ ++
Figure 1. Example of Identifying Pareto Optimal Options
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified set of potential solutions. Multi-
objective optimization can provide a framework for choosing among
these alternatives. For purposes of this exercise, it is assumed that each
option in Figure 1 is Pareto optimal in that it would not be possible to
improve one objective further without degrading another. In this situation,
there could be a wide range - of potential solutions ranging from
maintaining the status quo to full ecosystem restoration. For each solution
or option (1, 2, and 3), the objectives of restoring the ecosystem
hydrology, improving water quality, protecting listed species A,
protecting MBTA-protected species B, and minimizing costs are
evaluated. The number of plus symbols indicates the extent to which a
particular option improves an objective. Zeros indicate no change from
status quo for the particular objective. As can be seen from Figure 1, each
of the listed options benefits some objectives to varying extents. Counting
up plus symbols does not necessarily demonstrate which of the options
represents the best solution because stakeholders' values may attribute
distinct weights to different objectives.
Step 5: Apply policy-based weighting factors
To accomplish this, it is necessary to include value and policy choices,
which can be applied by using weighting factors. Value and policy-based
weighting factors would be established in advance of decision-making
based on decision-maker policy preferences and meaningful input from
the full range of stakeholder communities. Factors to be considered in
weighting could include, for example, the following:
1. A preference for protecting species that are capable of recovery
and are not "lost causes";
2. A preference for protecting species that do not have significant
alternative habitat available;
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3. A preference for protecting the most imperiled species;
4. A preference for protecting species that existed in the area prior
to human alteration;
5. A preference for avoiding environmental harms that are
irreversible (e.g., species extinction) or values that once
destroyed are irreversible or only reversible over a very long time
(e.g., water resources eutrophication);
6. A preference for options that have ecosystem-wide benefits
rather than benefiting individual species or resources;
7. A preference for restoring habitat to pre-anthropogenic
alteration conditions;
8. A preference for options for which there are mitigation or
offset options readily available; and
9. A preference for options that are unlikely to be successfully
challenged in court due to clearly applicable statutory flexibility
mechanisms.
It is important that the weighting factors be established early in the
process and are not used as post hoc rationalizations for decisions that are
made. If the preferences described above are inserted as weighting
factors, a preferred solution may emerge.
Final Step: Choose the "optimal" solution207
The final step in the Multi-Objective Optimization process is to
determine which option, or options, representing a set of trade-offs, is the
optimal solution.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests Multi-Objective Optimization as a methodology
to harmonize discordant statutory objectives. Section II illustrates, by
means of several examples, the ways in which environmental statutory
objectives and processes come into conflict. Although most states allow
for at least some flexibility in their implementation, in the absence of a
structured framework for multi-objective decision-making, policymakers
are left to make ad hoc decisions. Ad hoc decision-making is not ideal
207. Because it is beyond the scope off this article and beyond the expertise of this author,
Step 6, using mathematical methods to determine which solutions are closest to ideal for each
criterion, is not included.
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for optimizing multiple objectives or assigning priority to those objectives
that science, policy or stakeholder values deems most important. Further,
ad hoc decision-making often occurs in a black box where it lacks the
transparency necessary to gain stakeholder confidence in the decision-
making process. The lack of a systematized methodology also increases
the risk that ad hoc decisions will be the arbitrary whim of the decision-
maker and will not have coherence with other similar decisions. Finally,
the lack of a decision-making framework to resolve discordancy and
optimize multiple competing objectives can lead to paralysis. Decision-
makers may be reluctant to decide issues because they are not sure how
to proceed in the face of conflicting objectives or for fear of running afoul
of one law by complying with another conflicting law. An example of this
is that the EPA failed for decades to engage in ESA consultation on
pesticide regulatory decisions because of the challenges of harmonizing
FIFRA and ESA objectives and processes.
Moreover, regulatory paralysis is not simply a lack of decision-
making. By failing to decide, an agency fails to act, which in some
circumstances prevents or delays important environmental protection
actions or leads to environmental degradation occurring during the time
the agency fails to take action. For example, if the stringent water quality
standards required for water entering the Everglades Protection Area lead
to further delay in restoring the hydrology of the system, the system will
further degrade. Areas of the Everglades starved for water may undergo
peat collapse or subsidence and species requiring wetter conditions may
suffer.
The mechanics of the MOO approach in Section IV demonstrate the
steps of the MOO process and the ways in which statutory objectives are
incorporated into the process. It further demonstrates the way that science,
economics, and stakeholder values can shape the process and identify and
apply priorities through the development and use of "weighting factors."
This Article represents a first step in advancing the application of MOO
to discordant environmental law objectives. In the future, it may to
possible to develop quantitative methodologies that could enhance the
process.
Multi-objective optimization holds the potential of reconciling
discordant environmental statutory objectives and processes by
systematically guiding agencies through a decision-making process of
identifying and choosing among options. By establishing a transparent
consistent process and acquiring agency buy-in to the process, agencies
will have more security that they are proceeding in the proper fashion
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without fear of alienating other agencies or running afoul of laws
implemented by other agencies. Stakeholders will have a clear
opportunity and point of entry for input into determine the "weighting
factors." Decision-making will be accomplished in a transparent manner
that can help stakeholders to better understand agencies' choices and may
help to build trust between stakeholders and policy-makers.
Glossary ofAcronyms and Abbreviations
BiOp Biological Opinion
CWA Clean Water Act
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESA Endangered Species Act
FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
FWS Fish and Wildlife Service
MBTA Migratory Bird Treaty Act
MOO Multi-Objective Optimization
NFMA National Forest Management Act
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NRC National Research Council
STA Stormwater Treatment Act
WQBEL Water Quality Based Effluent Limitation
WQS Water Quality Standard
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